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The task was to determine the reasons for safety violations by foreign drivers supplying raw 
materials to the plant and plan the arrangements to prevent risks related to safety issues. 
The idea was to perform risk assessment of the main working areas and employ root cause 
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Abbreviations and definitions 
RCP 
 
CP 
 
KAI4, KAI6, KAI7 
LTAF 
 
TRIF 
 
NHS 
OSH/OHS 
ILO 
EU-28 
EMR 
 
 
ERP 
SMS 
RCA 
 
 
PPE 
Heavy traffic 
Recovered paper (old newsprint recycled and used 
for manufacturing of new paper products) 
Chemical pulp (man-made cellulose – mix of wood 
chips and chemicals) 
Paper machines 4, 6 and 7 at UPM Kaipola plant 
Lost-Time Accident Frequency (time from the 
moment accident occurred to the recovery) 
Total Recordable Injury Frequency (total number 
of lost-time injuries per million working hours) 
National Health Service 
Occupational Safety and Health 
International Labour Organization  
28 member countries of the European Union 
Experience Modification Rate (a number used by 
insurance companies to gauge both past cost of 
injuries and future chances of risk) 
Enterprise Resource Planning 
Safety Management System 
Root Cause Analysis (a combination of tools aimed 
to identify the true cause of a problem and the 
actions necessary to eliminate it) 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Both truck and combined vehicle traffic as well as 
rail traffic 
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1 Introduction to the case 
1.1 Big picture 
In today’s world, the globalization process and common use of outsourced services 
result in creating massive networks of companies whose operations are dependent 
on each other. In such conditions, they have to manage more than five different 
supply chains all over the world, and it is challenging to ascertain that everything 
goes as planned. It often causes insufficient communication between various hubs so 
that such important aspects of any business as safety go into the background and are 
difficult to control. In the long run, this fact has a negative impact on the operational 
efficiency of a company and leads to disruptions in logistics. This UPM case study 
aimed to reveal those effects, find the reasons and make development proposals for 
the existing safety management system. (Waters 2011, 11-13.) 
1.2 UPM in brief 
The thesis was carried out for the UPM-Kymmene Corporation – a Finnish company 
that integrates bio and forest industries, in particular, for its paper mill located in 
Kaipola (Jämsä). In general, depending on the different types of the company’s 
operations, there are several major subdivisions: 
• UPM Biorefining – pulp, timber and biofuels 
• UPM Energy – low-emission energy generation 
• UPM Raflatac – self-adhesive label materials 
• UPM Speciality papers – label papers and high-end office papers  
• UPM Paper ENA – graphic papers 
• UPM Plywood – plywood and veneer products 
The Group employs around 19 600 people, and it has production plants in 13 
countries. The factories are located all over Finland, but in this case the main focus 
was on the business operations conducted in the UPM Jämsä River mills which 
consist of two units: one in Jämsänkoski specialized in manufacturing uncoated 
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magazine paper and label papers, and another one in Kaipola producing coated 
magazine paper, directory paper and newsprint. (UPM Jämsä River Mills 2015, 2.) 
1.3 UPM Kaipola current situation 
There are two UPM paper mills having a direct economic impact on the development 
of Jämsä region: in Jämsänkoski and Kaipola. All together they employ approximately 
940 workers including contractors. The main raw materials used in the production 
are: 
• Spruce 
• Saw mill chips 
• Recovered paper 
• Chemical pulp  
For their manufacturing operations they utilize six paper machines with the total 
production capacity of 1 370 000 tons per year, one de-inking plant which reuses 2/3 
of the recovered paper in Finland and the company’s own power plants which 
generate steam and electricity.  
The factories specialize in producing: 
• Printing papers for magazines, newsprint and directories  
• Label papers and packaging papers 
Over 80 % of their products go for export. 
In Kaipola, they operate with paper machine 4 producing (7.04 m wide) directory 
paper out of thermos mechanical pulp and recovered paper, paper machine 7 and a 
de-inking plant for (8.40 m wide) newsprint and directory paper with the same kinds 
of raw materials. Moreover, they also have paper machine 6 making (8.26 m wide) 
coated magazine paper using thermos mechanical pulp, chemical pulp, pigments and 
binders. 
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1.4 Targets and KPIs 
There are four main goals for the company in general, and therefore its plants in 
Jämsä strive to achieve: 
1. Absolute safety – operation with zero accidents 
2. Customer satisfaction which comes from production efficiency and sufficient 
product quality 
3. Cost effectiveness via circular economy and value creation 
4. Environmental friendliness – responsible use of water and resources plus 
waste management 
In order to evaluate how these objectives are followed, UPM uses several Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) and measures for each of them. These indicators are 
divided into four sections in accordance with the focus areas of the company’s 
business. The information in Appendix 1 is related to May 2017. Since the evaluation 
figures are not to be disclosed as they belong to the confidential data of UPM, the 
measures are rated and categorized as weak (red), improved (yellow) or target 
(green). Some indicators, such as customer claims or power index, are assessed 
individually for each paper machine operated in the Kaipola mill as the figures vary 
greatly, which is why the machines are represented in the table with abbreviations 
according to their numbers: KAI4, KAI6 and KAI7 (see Appendix 1). It demonstrates 
the current level of performance from different perspectives. Development and 
improvement needs are especially evident in the area of safety as all the related 
measures are evaluated as weak or rather improved. 
1.5 Preconditions 
The trigger of the increased attention to occupational safety was the accident 
occurred in UPM Shotton’s recovered-fibre warehouse in Deeside, the UK. As a result 
of security breaches, a worker was struck by a large bucket loader driven by another 
contract worker. Consequently, it led to his death and halting of logistics operations. 
This tragic event happened six months after UPM’s Shotton paper mill was lauded for 
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passing the milestone of five years of operation without any lost time accidents. 
(UPDATED: Man killed at UPM paper mill 2017.)  After this incident and another 
potential one that occurred in Kaipola (a not properly picked up unstable pile of RCP 
fell down right behind a contract worker who was too close to the lifting grabbers of 
the vehicle), the wheel loaders were equipped with cameras so that their drivers 
could see what was going on in front when they had the load lifted. 
According to the UPM Annual Report 2016, there were also two fatal accidents in the 
previous year. One of them involved a Finnish employee at a Finnish paper mill and 
another a contractor in the UPM operations in Uruguay during forestry work. (UPM 
Annual Report 2016, 45.) 
However, the company drives continuous improvements in safety and strives to 
become a leader in this area. Statistically, according to safety manager Risto Elo 
(2017), in the previous years incidents occurred in the UMP Kaipola more frequently. 
For example, in 2010-2012 there were 30-40 accidents per million working hours, 
and due to constant enhancement of safety management by 2016, this number was 
reduced to five. By the end of May 2017, three accidents had already happened, 
which meant approximately six accidents per million working hours. Even though the 
company has made a considerable progress in safety, one of its main targets is to 
operate with zero accidents. 
2 Research bases 
According to Khan (2011), research means a search for facts, answers to questions 
and solutions to problems through the application scientific methodology. Therefore, 
before starting the research, the objectives of the study are to be clearly stated. 
2.1 Objective and questions 
The research work aimed to ensure contract carriers’ compliance with the safety 
rules. Frequent safety violations, such as not wearing special protective equipment, 
smoking on the paper mill site, walking around the premises without permission and 
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other violations mainly by Russian speaking drivers transporting raw materials are 
examples of incidents lately observed. Due to the lack of permanent contacts with 
the suppliers and common language between the drivers and operators it is 
challenging to establish communication and determine the reasons for such 
behaviour. 
Guided by the main objective, three key research questions were defined for this 
case study: 
• How are the drivers instructed in terms of safety? 
• How is the communication between the drivers and UPM operators 
conducted? 
• How to monitor the drivers’ activity and ensure their following of the 
established safety norms? 
These questions were supposed to address the reasons for the violations and 
consider possible solutions for the problems. 
2.2 Boundaries  
The research is limited by two operations:  
• Recovered paper (RCP) from Russia to Kaipola delivered by Russian trucking 
companies. On average, there are 20-25 trucks daily delivering the material to 
the mill warehouse. 
RCP includes magazines, newspapers, brochures, advertising material or any other 
paper publications. In Kaipola, the capacity is approximately 540 tons per day. The 
finished product contains approximately over 50% of de-inked, renewable fibre. 
• Chemical pulp from Stora Enso to Kaipola is transported by contract carriers, 
such as VR Transpoint, DB Schenker and Perälä using the services of Russian 
speaking drivers. On average, there are 30 trucks (meaning approximately 1 
200 tons of material supplied) coming to Kaipola per week via different 
transport operators. 
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Figure 1. Supply chain map 
Chemical pulp (man-made cellulose) is produced by combining wood chips and 
chemicals under high pressure. Kaipola monthly consumes about 5 000 tons of 
chemical pulp for paper production. The material is supplied in the form of big thick 
sheets, which are ground and pulped with water before feeding to the paper 
machine. 
Figure 1 shows how the supply of these raw materials is organized. Production sites 
and warehouses are marked with squares. The blue arrows represent recycled paper 
and the orange one chemical pulp. There are also key carriers listed for each 
category of materials in relation to the units which arrange the transportation: Stora 
Enso (a supplier) is in direct contact with the carriers and responsible for chemical 
pulp carriage, whereas for recycled paper, UPM Russia organizes the supply from 
RCP warehouses located in different places using the services of Russian 
transportation companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some safety instructions and general guidance translated into the Russian language 
had been sent to the UPM office in Saint Petersburg. However, there is no guarantee 
UPM Russia 
• NBI Transport Service 
• ILS 
• TruckLine: 
o IP Shestakov V.V. 
o Tranzit-M 
o Premium Transport 
UPM Kaipola 
Stora Enso 
• VR Transpoint 
• Perälä 
• DB Schenker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
that they finally reach the drivers and if they are actually being instructed. Finnish 
carriers are supposed to follow the Safety requirements for heavy traffic in the UPM 
Finland production plants. Moreover, drivers transporting to UPM for the first time 
should go through an online safety induction in order to receive a company 
authorized safety card. However, this process is also out of control, and it is not clear 
in which way international drivers receive the same kinds of instructions. 
Between 2012-2016 the situation in terms of safety visibility was considerably 
improved especially at the receiving station and warehouse of RCP: there are special 
signs showing what kind of safety equipment the drivers must wear, memos with 
basic rules to be followed as well as guidelines on whom to contact in case of 
emergency. Nevertheless, there are still violations and difficulties in communication. 
Table in Appendix 2 represents how and through which hubs the general guidelines 
provided by UPM Kaipola go until they reach the drivers. The information flow varies 
based on the operation, but it consists at least of four levels. In this case Level 1 
refers to UPM Kaipola passing safety directives to Level 2 represented by UPM Russia 
for RCP or rather the Finnish chemical pulp supplier, Stora Enso. From Level 2 they go 
to Level 3 – directly to the key carriers and/or the forwarding company, which is 
responsible for substitution carriers (Level 4) and thereafter for providing them with 
safety instructions. The carriers, in turn, undertake to instruct the drivers (Level 4 or 
Level 5). Such structure of information flow illustrates the vulnerability of the system, 
as it seems to be difficult to guarantee sufficient communication and data provision 
between different units. There is a high risk that the information is lost, incomplete 
or inaccurate on its way. 
2.3 Approach and methods 
At the beginning of any kind of project, the research approach and methods used for 
studying the subject have to be defined. They are supposed to help the researcher to 
find the most effective way to meet the objectives. Research approaches are plans 
and procedures for research projects that span the steps from broad assumption to 
detailed methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Creswell 2014, 3). In 
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general, these approaches are divided into two main categories: quantitative and 
qualitative. The difference is that the first one is used to quantify attitudes, opinions 
or behaviours within a large sample population via transforming collected numerical 
data into statistics, whereas the second one is more focused on understanding of 
underlying reasons and motivations and studying the problem more deeply while the 
sample size is typically small. (Wyse 2011.) However, there is also a mixed methods 
approach that involves collecting and integrating both quantitative and qualitative 
forms of data. The core assumption of this type of inquiry is that the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches provides a more complete understanding of 
a research problem. (Creswell 2014, 4-5.) In this case, qualitative methods were used 
since the major goal of this study case was to define the causes of violations that 
required profound study of the established safety culture in the organization as well 
as employee behaviour and attitudes concerning this area. Methods of qualitative 
research include observation and immersion, interviews, open-ended surveys, focus 
groups, content analysis of visual and textual materials, and oral history (Crossman 
2017). The decision was to concentrate on the following three methods: 
• Non-participant observation is observation with limited interaction with the 
people one observes.  This option is used to understand a phenomenon by 
entering the community while staying separate from the activities being 
observed.  (Liu, & Maitlis 2010.) This method often involves the use of video or 
audio recording devices. The observer is interested in overseeing the actions 
of the subjects without influence on their behaviour as the aim of this strategy 
is to observe the operations in natural conditions and reveal their relevant 
issues. (Silverman 2016.) In this study case, conducting regular observations 
allowed to watch the normal working process of the drivers and note their 
violations. 
• Semi-structured reflective interview is an interview in which the interviewer 
refers to a prepared interview guide that includes a certain number of 
questions. These questions are usually open-ended, but their order and form 
may vary depending on what is said by any individual respondent. It requires 
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highly developed listening skills from the interviewer to follow up and adjust 
the conversation. (Ruolston 2010, 15.) Interviewing the drivers and 
transportation companies was supposed to be the most effective way to create 
a temporary communication bridge between UPM and the contract carriers. 
Moreover, it should help to understand their awareness, different views of the 
current situation and attitudes towards complying with the safety rules 
established by UPM. 
• Content analysis is a method of describing the meaning of qualitative material 
in a systematic way (Shreier 2012). Furthermore, Mayring (2010) gives a 
broader definition to qualitative content analysis as a set of techniques for the 
systematic analysis of texts of many kinds, addressing not only manifest 
content but also the themes and core ideas found in a text as primary content. 
Basically, it works on the principle that the more a topic is mentioned, then the 
more important it is considered to be. It is also used for quality comparison of 
data from different sources. (Crowther & Lancaster 2005, 183.) Content 
analysis of the UPM safety documents was necessary in order to define and 
summarize all the safety requirements applied specifically to the truck drivers 
and see how they were reflected in the instructions. Based on the results, it 
might also be useful to compare the guidelines of UPM and transportation 
companies to ascertain that there are no crucial differences or drawbacks. 
This kind of research is called triangulation that refers to the use of a variety of 
methods with a view of exploring the objective from different angles (Davies 2007). 
There are four basic types of triangulation:  
• Data triangulation (involves time, space, and persons) 
• Investigator triangulation (involves multiple researchers in an 
investigation) 
• Theory triangulation (involves using more than one theoretical scheme in 
the interpretation of the phenomenon) 
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• Methodological triangulation (involves using more than one option to 
collect data, such as interviews, observations, questionnaires, and 
documents) (Kennedy, 2009.) 
The last one was selected for this thesis since it was based on observations, 
interviews and documents. The combination of these data collection methods was 
supposed to guarantee the authenticity of the collected information. Familiarization 
with the safety rules established in the company and used by the carriers through 
document studies was important for knowing what kinds of requirements existed for 
the various groups of employees and for defining possible differences or flaws. 
Moreover, the author needed to observe the operations in order to obtain the visual 
evidence of actual safety violations. The reasoning and more detailed information 
about the situation in transport companies could be acquired through direct 
interaction (interviews) with the drivers. 
2.4 Root cause analysis 
The information collected from the safety documents, observations and interviews 
needs to be processed. This chapter describes one of the most common techniques 
used for data analysis aiming to solve a root of a problem.  
One of the ways to identify future risk is to ask questions about the reasons for 
occurring of such an event in the past. In theory after inquiring five times why, one 
should achieve an initial cause of an issue, in a formal way this method is called root 
cause analysis and defined as a structured investigation that aims to identify the true 
cause of a problem and the actions necessary to eliminate it. However, it has much 
wider meaning as it combines a number of different techniques, tools and approaches. 
The origin of root cause analysis can be traced to the broader field of TQM – total 
quality management that also includes problem analysing and solving. Root cause 
analysis is one of the core building blocks in an organization’s continuous 
improvement efforts. (Andersen 2006, 21-22.) Used in reactive mode, it can prevent 
problems from recurring. Used in proactive mode, it can examine current operations 
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and help to identify areas and activities that can be improved. (Wilson, Dell, & 
Anderson 1993, 8.) There are many methodologies applying variable tools for 
conducting root cause analysis. The most common root cause analysis approaches are 
as followed: 
• Events and casual factor analysis used for major, single-event problems when 
the evidence is obtained quickly and methodically to establish a timeline for 
the activities leading up to the accident; 
• Change analysis applicable when a system’s performance has shifted 
significantly; 
• Barrier analysis focuses on what controls (physical, administrative and 
procedural) are in place in the process to either prevent or detect a problem 
(Okes 2009, 4-5); 
• Management oversight and risk tree  (MORT) analysis uses a tree diagram to 
examine what occurred and why it might have occurred, it lists on the left side 
of the tree specific factors relating to the occurrence and on the right side – 
the management deficiencies that permit specific risk factors to exist; 
• Human performance evaluation (HPE) used to identify factors that influence 
task performance, focuses on operability and work environment (Resse 2016, 
109); 
• Kepner-Tregue problem solving and decision making provides a systematic 
framework for collecting, organizing, and evaluating information and consists 
of four basic steps for resolving problems: situation analysis, problem analysis, 
solution analysis and potential problem analysis (Okes 2009, 4-5). 
The structured summary of these root cause methods is represented in Figure 
3 that describes in which cases the particular method is used, its pros and cons 
as well as specifies what should be taken into account when applying the 
method. 
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Figure 2. Summary of root cause methods (adapted from Resse 2016) 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that certain methods are used for different circumstances. 
However, in general, the whole analytical process can be completed in four major 
stages: 
1) Data collection 
Without complete information and an understanding of the event, the casual 
factors and root causes associated with the event cannot be identified 
2) Casual factor charting 
A sequence diagram with logic tests that describes the events leading up to an 
occurrence and the conditions surrounding these events 
3) Root cause identification 
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This process starts after all the casual factors are identified. It involves the use 
of a decision diagram called the Root Cause Map to identify the underlying 
reasons for each casual factor  
4) Recommendation generation and implementation 
Following identification of the root causes for a particular causal factor, 
achievable recommendations for preventing its recurrence are then 
generated. (Rooney, & Vanden Heuvel 2004, 46-49.) 
Root cause analysis often involves applying a variety of tools, either in sequence or in 
multiple iterations using the same tool (Andersen 2006, 23-25). 
In order to understand the principle of how these tools work in practice it is useful to 
select some of them and describe them more specifically. The seven key tools as 
defined by the American Society for Quality are the flowchart for graphically 
depicting a process, Pareto chart for identifying the largest frequency in a set of 
data, Ishikawa diagram for graphically depicting causes related to an effect, run 
chart for displaying occurrences over time, check sheet for totalling count data that 
can be later analysed, scatter diagram for visualizing the relationship between 
variables and histogram for depicting the frequency of occurrences. A few of those 
were used in the current case study. Therefore, it is useful to provide their detailed 
description. 
The first important matter to understand the problem is to know how the specific 
operation is organized step-by-step.  Flowchart is used to describe a process. It uses 
symbols to represent activities and decision points in a process (see Figure 3): oval – 
start and end of a process, rectangles – its individual activities, diamond – yes or no 
decision and lines with arrows depict the flow of a process. (Brassard & Ritter, 2010)  
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Figure 3. Flowchart (adapted from Barsalou 2015) 
 
A root cause investigator can use a flowchart to map a process and thereby gain a 
better understanding of factors relating to the process. For instance, a root cause 
investigator searching for the root cause of sporadic defective parts from a 
production machine may create a flowchart of the manufacturing process from the 
input of raw materials to the completion of the finished parts. A flowchart is 
particularly useful for process-related failures, such as when a quality manager must 
determine the root cause for order being improperly entered into ERP system. 
(Barsalou 2015.) 
In the case under study it was essential to understand what process steps the driver 
went through after arriving at UPM Kaipola in order to define at which stage there 
was a lack of control or the driver simply had difficulties to do his job. Those were 
the stages at which safety risks were high. 
Check sheet is another tool usually used for prioritization of a root cause 
investigation. It helps to quantify failure data and identify what kind of events 
happen more frequently. Figure 4 represents the traditional cheek sheet consisting 
of failure type, marks of the event occurred and the total number of them.  
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Figure 4. Check sheet (adapted from Barsalou 2015) 
 
Check sheet was a simple and effective method for listing all the observed safety 
violations and marking every time when they were noticed. That way the researcher 
was able to analyse the occurrence of each violation and reveal the critical ones.  
Figure 5 shows another example of the use of a check sheet to determine the cause 
of lower sales per day than budgeted in a bookstore, which is located in the large 
shopping mall. In order to understand why the customers came to the store to 
browse but not buying anything, during a two-week period the staff was asking each 
client who left without purchase why this happened. (Andersen, & Fagerhaug 2006.) 
 
Figure 5. Check sheet example – Bookstore (adapted from Andersen & Fagerhaug 2006) 
 
In 37 out of 101 cases (36.6 %), the reason was not finding the item which means 
that there is either a little range of books sold in the store or a poor organization of 
them on the shelves.  
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Data from check sheet can be analysed using run charts. Run chart is applied for 
monitoring process performance over time to detect trends as well as allowing an 
analyst to compare a performance measure before and after implementation of a 
solution.  
 
Figure 6. Run chart (adapted from Barsalou 2015) 
 
In Figure 6 the x-axis is used to indicate time, which increases from left to right and 
the y-axis, is where the measurement results are placed, for instance, the number of 
accident occurrences per day for the period of one week. (Barsalou 2015, 29.) 
Run charts are useful in understanding if enhancement work has a significant impact 
on the measure to be improved. Consider Figure 7, which shows patient waiting 
times in a Renal Outpatient Clinic. There are no shifts (eight points consecutively 
above or below the median) and no trends (six points consecutively increasing or 
decreasing). Therefore, the process shows common cause variation and is in 
statistical control. (Harrison 2012, 6.) 
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Figure 7. Run Chart example – Patient Waiting Times in a Renal Outpatient Clinic I (adapted from Harrison 
2012) 
 
The team then decides to introduce a new booking schedule and continue recording 
patient waiting times. The median line is fixed at 42.5. These results are then plotted 
on a new run chart with our baseline data in Figure 8. (ibid., 7) 
 
Figure 8. Run Chart example – Patient Waiting Times in a Renal Outpatient Clinic II (adapted from Harrison 
2012) 
 
Figure 8 shows that there has been a shift shown by the oval – with a run of ten 
points below the median. The chart is no longer in control and therefore a 
statistically significant change has occurred. The New Schedule Introduced change in 
schedule has resulted in a considerable reduction in waiting times. (ibid., 7-8.) 
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In the study case the idea was for the period of three month (from the middle of May 
to the middle of August 2017) with weekly observations to see the trend of violations 
occurrence before and after some improvements were done. This way the 
researcher could understand if the correction actions were effective or not. 
The last but not the least important tool to be used is Ishikawa diagram or so-called 
fish bone diagram due to its schematic representation. It consists of the horizontal 
line leading to the effect on the right side and several inclined lines along this core 
labelled with the potential factors. Traditionally analysts list the factors as six Ms: 
man (power), material, milieu (alternatively environment), methods, machine and 
measurement. (See Figure 9) Material describes factors related to raw materials and 
information issues, method is associated with the operational processes and their 
organizational inefficiencies, machine – equipment, systems and machinery failures, 
man means physical or knowledge work, cultural particularities and coordination 
problems, measurement is related to the insufficient evaluation and control of the 
operations and environment – external factors causing disorders. Each of the angled 
lines should have a description with influences of each factor. For example, it could 
be high temperature in case of environment, lack of training – in manpower or 
component damage – in machine. 
 
Figure 9. Ishikawa diagram (adapted from Barsalou 2015) 
 
Since this kind of diagram is aimed to define the reasons for a certain impact, it often 
can be found in literature as cause-and-effect chart.   
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Figure 10 shows an example of its use in a company operating cable television 
services, which has a consistently high level of employee absenteeism, especially in 
the installation and service department. This has already led to a number of negative 
consequences such as extra costs, longer service time and, as a result, angry 
customers. In order to improve situation, human resource manager and some service 
personnel arranged brainstorming session to generate the ideas about this 
phenomenon, to sort the relevant ones, the team analysed all ideas and grouped the 
causes on the chart. 
 
Figure 10. Cause-and-effect chart example – Cable Television Company (adapted from Andersen & Fagerhaug 
2006) 
 
The results made the company consider training programs, reward systems and 
increasing the quality of the tools and equipment used by the service personnel. 
(Andersen & Fagerhaug 2006.) 
In this case study, after analysing the reasons for violations based on safety 
document studies, interviews and observations, it was useful to divide them into 
different factor groups in order to understand what kind of working parameters 
mostly influenced occurring of the certain violation and which of them should be 
primarily fixed.  
There are many other tools supporting different steps of root cause analysis, 
however, the combination of four presented can already provide diverse and 
profound processed information for further solution proposals. 
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3 Safety culture 
This chapter is aimed to define the terms of safety culture and demonstrate its 
importance in the operation of each organization. 
3.1 Definition and key elements 
First of all, it is worth to uncover the concept of safety. According to Dr Stian 
Antonsen (2016, 7.), it consists of three elements that refer to: 
1. A state or situation where the statistical risk is deemed to be acceptable or as 
low as reasonably practicable 
2. A feeling of security and control 
3. A practice associated with our ability to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of 
hazardous events occurring  
It is also important not to be confused with two terms safety and security. Both of 
them have their origins in the area of IT – generally they are used to characterize 
computer systems. In simple words safety is the condition of being protected from 
harm whereas security is the process of ensuring safety. 
Occupational safety has even more narrow meaning since it relates particularly to 
unintended accidental events that occur in work organizations. Safety regulations 
established in a company are supposed to give quite detailed guide for action and 
behaviour to the employees. However, the question is how in fact sufficient and visible 
they are for each worker that is reflected in the term safety culture. It originated in 
1986 in the process of cause and effect analysis of the Chernobyl accident conducted 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The deficient safety culture was 
recognized as the main root cause of the explosion in reactor. (ibid., 10.) 
The concept of safety culture basically refers to the way of behaviour adopted in the 
organization in terms of safety that does not necessarily represent the rational model 
of action. The cultural frames of reference include a set of shared perceptions of what 
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is considered to be safe and what dangerous. The more widely shared these 
assumptions are the less the organization’s ability to detect signals of danger that fall 
outside these frames of reference. (ibid., 13.)  
The safety culture is an integral part of the overall production culture and is a 
combination of the administration activities and the behaviour of personnel aimed at 
ensuring the safety of potentially hazardous industries and facilities. 
The safety culture of an organization should be based on the following key principles: 
• Awareness by each employee of the importance of ensuring safety 
• Responsibility of each employee, realized through understanding and rigorous 
execution of job descriptions 
• High level of knowledge and competence of managers providing personnel 
training and implementation of security measures 
• Regular supervision and control over the state of the systems responsible for 
the safety of the enterprise and the training of personnel 
As well as all areas of company’s business, safety culture should be somehow managed 
and developed in the long run. Safety management system is usually created for that. 
In general, it stands for minimizing injuries. In addition, a reliable management system 
can increase efficiency; improve productivity, morale, quality of products and etc. 
(Roughton, Mercurio, & James 2002, 3.) Besides it is also important to remember that 
a correct safety balance cannot be achieved unless acceptable and unacceptable 
conditions are established early enough in the program to allow the selection of the 
optimum design solution and operational alternatives (Antonsen 2016, 14). 
Unfortunately, the importance of creating a comprehensive, well-managed safety and 
health program that supports the management system is often underestimated. The 
main reason is that not all effects and costs associated with the incidents are often 
taken into account. That is why it is worth illustrating this idea in the chapter 3.4.  
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3.2 Cultural dimensions 
The concept of safety culture is perceived differently depending on the country it 
applies to as cultural particularities affect the attitude of people towards complying 
with the rules. Indeed many researches, which prove that the relationship to 
different aspects of life largely depends on the kind of environment in which a 
person grew up, have been recently conducted. One of such brainstorming theories 
was introduced by a Dutch social psychologist – Geert Hofstede, who defined culture 
as the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one 
group or category of people from another. He claimed that culture is learned derived 
from one’s social environment so that it cannot be inherited. (Hofstede 2010, 4-7.) 
There are several layers of culture which influence human personality’s formation: 
• a national level according to one's country ( or countries for people who 
migrated during their lifetime); 
• a regional and/or ethnic and/or religious and/or linguistic affiliation level, 
as most nations are composed of culturally different regions and/ or ethnic 
and/or religious and/or language groups; 
• a gender level, according to whether a person was born as a girl or as a boy; 
• a generation level, which separates grandparents from parents from 
children; 
• a social class level, associated with educational opportunities and with a 
person's occupation or profession; 
• for those who are employed, an organizational or corporate level according 
to the way employees have been socialized by their work organization. (ibid. 
18.) 
In his studies Hofstede focused on defining the national culture differences by 
collecting survey data about the values of people in over 50 countries around the 
world. A statistical analysis of the answers on questions about the values of IBM 
employees in different countries revealed common problems, but with solutions 
differing from country to country, in the following areas: 
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1. Social inequality, including the relationship with authority; 
2. The relationship between the individual and the group; 
3. Concepts of masculinity and femininity: the social implications of having been 
born as a boy or a girl; 
4. Ways of dealing with uncertainty, relating to the control of aggression and 
the expression of emotions. 
Based on these results, the researcher distinguished four major dimensions of 
cultures: 
1) Power distance  
It is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organizations within a country accept that power is distributed unequally. 
2) Collectivism versus individualism 
It refers to the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its 
members. 
3) Femininity versus masculinity 
The fundamental issue is what motivates people, wanting to be the best 
(masculine) or liking what they do (feminine). 
4) Uncertainty avoidance  
It measures the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by 
uncertain situations. (ibid. 29-31.) 
Besides those major cultural characteristics there are also long term orientation 
(linking past experience to deal with the challenges of the present and future) and 
indulgence (the extent to which people try to control their desires and impulses) 
defined by the sociologist later in his research (Hofstede 2017). 
Based on interviews of IBM employees with different backgrounds, Hofstede rated 
each of 50 countries under study from small to large according to the level 
characterized by these dimensions. These figures are to be utilized for analysing the 
concern about safety regulations in Russian and Finnish societies. The most relevant 
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dimensions to this topic are uncertainty avoidance  (how important is a law 
establishment is considered in the country for avoiding ambiguous circumstances) 
the power distance (the role of authorities in ensuring the compliance with safety 
rules) and collectivism vs individualism (the role of general public perception and the 
example of group members behaviour in terms of complying with safety regulations). 
The reader will get to know about those in more details in the analytical part of the 
thesis. 
3.3 Occupational health and safety (OHS) 
This chapter is aimed to describe the term of occupational safety more in details. In 
general, it can be defined as the health and well being of people employed in a work 
environment. Statistically, there are more than 250 million work-related accidents 
every year. Workplace hazards and exposures cause over 160 million workers to fall ill 
annually, while it has been estimated that more than 1.2 million workers die as a result 
of occupational accidents and diseases. Social and economic costs are unacceptable; 
therefore, continuous progress in protecting health and safety is a priority objective 
for International Labour Organization (ILO). (Benjamin 2001.) 
The roots of OSH can be found at the time of the Industrial Revolution in the early 
1800s. Factories and their new technologies, complex machines and production 
methods quickly spread throughout the continent. New skills were needed to operate 
the new machines and factories, but working conditions did not progress at the same 
pace. Occupational risks became more serious and difficult to prevent, leading to 
accidents, disabilities and fatalities at work. It emerged the need to be protected from 
industrial hazards and risks. The first modern legislation on health and safety came 
into force in Britain and Norway almost at the same period.  However, legislation was 
not the only way of securing OSH – key public institutions contributing to its 
development, such as labour inspectorates, were also created. (Castillo 2016.)  
In 1978, the Council of the European Union passed a resolution on the first Action 
Programme on Safety and Health at Work in the EU (Council of the European 
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Communities 1978). The aim of the programme was to increase the level of 
protection against occupational risks of all types; it aimed to do this by increasing 
preventive measures as well as by the monitoring and controlling of risks. The EU 
legislative structure was supported by various building blocks such as the European 
Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EUOSHA) and the Advisory Committee on 
Safety and Health at Work. (Castillo 2016.)  Nonetheless, new directives and social 
policies needed to be implemented in order to achieve European harmonization in 
health and safety. Therefore, in the mid-2000s, the European Commission adopted 
‘Better Regulation’ as a key strategy. Better Regulation – an approach born in the 
United States and then adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD 1995) – focuses on simplifying legislative actions. Updating 
directives and their content, the European Commission focused mainly on 
competitiveness and innovation. 
In 2014 a new Strategic Framework was announced for the period 2014-2020. It 
contains three major challenges: ‘improving the implementation record of Member 
States, in particular by enhancing the capacity of micro and small enterprises to put 
in place effective and efficient risk prevention measures; improving the prevention of 
work related diseases by tackling existing, new and emerging risks; tackling 
demographic change’ (European Commission 2014a).  
It is worth noting that there are significant variations in occupational health and 
safety performance between: 
• Different countries (for example, a factory worker in Pakistan is eight 
times more likely to be killed at work than a factory worker in France); 
• Economic sectors (agriculture, forestry, mining and construction take the 
lead in the incidence of occupational deaths worldwide); 
• Sizes of enterprise (small workplaces have a worse safety record than 
large ones). 
Moreover, there are groups of employees who are particularly at risk such as  
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• Female workers (safety standards are based on the model of a male 
worker);  
• Home-based workers (in some countries they are subjected to normal 
health and safety legislation, in others not); 
• Part-time workers (suffer from not being covered by health and safety 
provisions); contract workers (accident rate is on average twice that of 
permanent workers); 
• Drivers (between 15 and 20 per cent of fatalities caused by road accidents 
are suffered by people in the course of their work).  
International Labour Organization utilizes a range of actions to promote occupational 
health and safety including international labour standards, codes of practice, the 
provision of technical advice and the dissemination of information. Occupational 
health and safety standards broadly fall into six groups, according to their scope or 
purpose:  
• Fundamental principles to guide policies for action; 
• General protection measures, for example, guarding of machinery, medical 
examination of young workers, or limiting the weight of loads to be 
transported by a single worker; 
• Protection in specific branches of economic activity, such as mining, the 
building industry, commerce and dock work; 
• Protection of specific professions (for example, nurses and seafarers) and 
categories of workers having particular occupational health needs (such as 
women or young workers); 
• Protection against specific risks (ionizing radiation, benzene, asbestos); 
prevention of occupational cancer; control of air pollution, noise and 
vibration in the working environment; and measures to ensure safety in the 
use of chemicals, including the prevention of major industrial accidents; 
• Organizational measures and procedures relating, for example, to labour 
inspection or compensation for occupational injuries and diseases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
In general, the ILO policy on occupational health and safety is essentially contained in 
two international labour Conventions and their accompanying Recommendations: 
1. ILO Occupational Safety and Health Convention (No. 155), and 
Recommendation (No. 164), 1981, which provide for the adoption of a 
national occupational safety and health policy, as well as describing the 
actions to be taken by governments and within enterprises to promote 
occupational safety and health and improve the working environment;  
2. ILO Occupational Health Services Convention (No. 161), and 
Recommendation (No. 171), 1985, which provide for the establishment of 
enterprise-level occupational health services designed to contribute towards 
implementing occupational safety and health policy. 
Based on the content of ILO regulations several core occupational and health 
principles are to be defined: 
I. All workers have rights. As the International Labour Conference stated in 
1984: 
a. work should take place in a safe and healthy working environment; 
b. conditions of work should be consistent with worker well-being and human 
dignity; 
c. work should offer real possibilities for personal achievement, self-fulfilment 
and service to society. 
II. Occupational health and safety policies must be established 
III. There is need for consultation with the social partners (that is, employers and 
workers) and other stakeholders 
IV. Prevention and protection must be the aim of occupational health and safety 
programmes and policies. Workplaces and working environments should be 
planned and designed to be safe and healthy. 
V. Information is vital for the development and implementation of effective 
programmes and policies. The collection of accurate information on hazards, 
monitoring of compliance with policies and good practices, and other related 
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activities are central to the establishment and enforcement of effective 
policies. 
VI. Health promotion is a central element of occupational health practice. 
VII. Occupational health services covering all workers should be established. 
VIII. Compensation, rehabilitation and curative services must be made available to 
workers who suffer occupational injuries, accidents and work-related 
diseases.  
IX. Education and training are vital components of safe, healthy working 
environments. Workers and employers must be made aware of the 
importance and the means of establishing safe working procedures. 
(Benjamin 2001.) 
According to ILO Newsroom, Finland joined ILO occupational health and safety 
programme in 2014. During the conference on this occasion taking place in Helsinki 
Finnish Minister of Social Affairs and Health, Laura Räty said: "With Finnish 
occupational health and safety know-how we want to improve the working 
conditions of target countries by promoting work that is fit for humans”.  
The programme was supposed to provide policy and strategy advice to governments, 
employers and workers in low and middle-income countries where OSH systems 
need to be strengthened. (Finland joins ILO occupational safety and health 
programme 2014.) Most of new Finnish OSH legislation is prepared in the bodies of 
the European Union at the initiative of the European Commission. Finnish experts 
take an active part in the preparation of EU OSH legislation. Finland’s aim is to 
achieve a modern, effective, fact-based and evidence-based body of Community law 
in this area. This approach has already brought some positive results. Finland is 
slightly below the EU average in the incidence of severe and fatal occupational 
accidents, and is pursuing a determined zero-accident policy, aiming to become a 
world leader in OSH promotion. (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2010.)  
European Union statistical data platform, Eurostat, provides information about fatal 
accidents at work in EU countries. Figure 11 represents a comparison of EU average 
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incidence rate in warehousing and support activities for transportation with rates in 
fourteen EU countries for the period of 2012-2014. It shows that Finland, having 
generally low incidence rate in logistics sector – around average of all EU countries, 
managed to reach zero level in 2013 and 2014. 
 
Figure 11. Fatal accidents at work in EU countries 2012-2014 (adapted from Eurostat 2017) 
 
3.4 Costs of incident 
First of all, damage to human health and life is itself a serious negative consequence 
of accidents caused by violations or improper safety management. From company’s 
operation point of view it is crucial to understand that every single incident leads to 
significant money loss. For instance, in a transport company studied by the Health and 
Safety Executive, the costs of accidents were equivalent to one third of its annual 
profits. (Health and Safety Commission 1999) Organizations incur both direct and 
indirect costs from workplace accidents and injuries: direct costs include payments to 
injured workers and costs of their treatment, and cost of health and accident 
insurance; indirect costs include lost productivity and overtime charges (Clarke 2016, 
12). They are represented by traditional iceberg concept: direct as an iceberg visible 
part above the water - accrued directly from the accident and indirect as an iceberg 
part submerged in the water - less obvious consequences of the accident. Although 
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the indirect ones are normally more difficult to define since most of them are hidden, 
they usually have greater impact on company’s profits and sales. In order to estimate 
an overall financial influence of incidents, we should be able to calculate both. Direct 
cost is the total value of insurance claims for an incident consisting of medical costs 
and indemnity payments. Indirect cost is a multiplication of the direct cost by a cost 
multiplier. The bigger the direct cost, the smaller the cost multiplier. This kind of costs 
may refer to a replacement employee, repair damaged property or equipment, 
downtime of equipment, investigating the incident and implementing corrective 
actions. Even less apparent are the costs related to product schedule delays, added 
administrative time, lower morale, increased absenteeism, pain of the employee and 
impaired customer relations. In the book subtitled Practical Loss Control Leadership 
the same analogy of iceberg theory was used to describe accident costs. While the 
visible tip of the iceberg accounts 1 $, from 5 $ to 50 $ is likely to be spent on below 
the surface adding from 1 $ to 3 $ of bottom costs. (Roughton 2002, 7-10.) 
 
Figure 12. The cost of incidents at work: ILCI cost studies (adapted from Roughton 2002) 
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In Figure 12 it is illustrated that the actual cost of workday injury is much greater than 
it seems to be from the surface. Indirect and hidden costs might cause much more 
significant financial and operational damage, they include: 
• Productive time lost by injured employee  
• Productive time lost by employees and supervisors attending the victim  
• Clean-up and start-up of operations interrupted by the incident  
• Time to hire and retrain other individuals to replace the injured employee until 
their return to work  
• Time and cost for repair or replacement of damaged equipment or materials  
• The cost of losing a valued customer due to poor performance or late delivery 
of goods and services 
• Poor or eroded morale among employees  
• Lower efficiency  
• Increase workers’ compensation EMR rates  
• Possible penalties or other sanctions applied where the injury is determined to 
be caused by a violation of regulations  
• The cost of completing the paperwork generated by the incident 
Therefore, these days companies aim to establish an efficient safety management in 
order to reduce the costs and risks associated with incidents. (ibid., 12-13) 
In general, there are a number of steps that can be taken to reduce the chance of 
accidents and ill health happening in the business: 
1. Determine what could cause harm 
2. Identify who might be harmed (employees, visitors and others) 
3. Decide what should be done to prevent anything happening to them 
4. Take action in a planned way recording what have been done 
5. Check these actions are still working from time to time (Health and Safety 
Commission 1999) 
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This list of steps is a simple guidance to safety engineers who have to accomplish 
a great work in order to realize preventative actions and manage the risks in the 
most effective way. 
3.5 Safety management system evaluation 
Safety relates directly to the quality of the production/service process inside an 
organization. Therefore, all safety management systems function within and support 
company’s operations system. Safety manager has an overall responsibility for the 
SMS, but primarily focuses on the physical safety and health of employees through the 
use of administrative controls to limit exposure to hazards. Whereas the safety 
engineer, who usually works in the maintenance or engineering department, is 
interested in using engineering controls to eliminate or reduce hazards. HR 
coordinator´s duty in terms of safety is to assure the quality of safety programs and 
affect the psychological health of employees. All these people are in charge of creating 
a structured and reliable SMS that can be supported by all the other employees. (OSH 
Academy 2017, 3-5.) Each safety management system consists of three main 
components defining its nature: 
• Inputs  
o Standards 
o People 
o Resources 
• Process  
o Procedures 
o Consequences 
• Outputs  
o Products and services 
o Conditions 
o Behaviours (Roughton 2002, 349) 
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After developing and implementing management system, it’s important to test and 
evaluate it in order to understand whether it works effectively. There are many tools 
that can be used to evaluate any workplace: independent review, employee safety 
perception survey, document (records) review, workplace evaluations, self-
assessments, job hazard analysis, employee interviews, etc. However, it is worth 
focusing on the three of them:  
• Reviewing documentation of specific activities (safety committees, business 
contracts, activity-based safety system and etc.); 
• Interviewing employees in the organization for their knowledge, awareness, 
and perceptions of what has happen to the management system and the safety 
program; 
• Reviewing site conditions and finding the opportunities for improvement in 
the management systems in case hazards are present. (ibid. 353) 
The key to a successful and efficient assessment and program evaluation is to combine 
elements when using each technique. First, review the available documentation 
relating to each element. Then walk through the workplace and observe how 
effectively what is on paper is implemented, in other words, verify compliance with 
the written documents. While walking around the facility, interview employees to 
confirm that what was read and what was seen reflects the state of the safety 
program. (ibid. 376.) 
These days there is a number of European standardisation organizations developing 
norms applied to the different aspects of company business such as product or 
service quality, environmental friendliness as well as health and safety at work. 
European Committee for Standardization (CEN), European Committee for Electro 
Technical Standardization (CENELEC) and European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) — set and update European standards on a regular basis. The 
companies are evaluated and certified in case their activities meet the essential 
requirements. In Finland the central body for standardisation is the Finnish Standards 
Association (SFS). There is also The Centre for Occupational Safety aims to improve 
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occupational safety, wellbeing at work, effectiveness, the work of supervisors and 
cooperation in workplace communities. It is administrating a Finnish National 
Occupational Safety Card that has rapidly become a popular way to complete the 
basic training in safety and health at work (The Occupational Safety Card 2007, 3). 
The UPM General Instructions state that all the supplier’s employees shall have a 
valid occupational safety card which is given upon completion of UPM Safety 
orientation e-learning course. It is mandatory for every employee who does physical 
work at a UPM production site, however, excluding drivers of heavy vehicles. 
Moreover, there is internationally applied British Standard for occupational health 
and safety management systems (OHSAS 18001) which is aimed to help all kinds of 
organization to identify and control health and safety risks, reduce the potential for 
accidents, aid legal compliance and improve their overall performance. (European 
Agency for Safety and Health at Work [Safety and health legislation], 2017) It is 
essential to note that according to UPM certification overview by April 2017 UPM 
Kaipola has already put OHSAS system in place, however, has not been certified yet. 
(UPM certification overview – status April 2017.) This fact directly testifies that safety 
management system at the plant still needs to be developed and improved in order 
to meet European standards. 
4 Risk evaluation and control 
4.1 Concept of risk 
The concept of risk has various definitions in literature. However, it can be generally 
constructed by two elements: probability of loss and significance of loss. Normally, risk 
is associated with negative effect, which can be expressed in terms of a threat, 
damage, loss, injury or other undesirable consequences. Risk is the chance high or low 
of being harmed by the hazard, and how serious harm could be. (Rocle 2014, 1.) It is 
very important to distinguish between a hazard and a risk – the two terms are often 
confused and activities often called high risk are in fact high hazard. Electricity is an 
example of a high hazard as it has a potential to kill a person. The risk associated with 
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electricity – the likelihood of being killed on coming into contact with an electrical 
device. (Hughes & Ferret 2015.) Mathematically it can be calculated in the following 
way: RISK = LIKELIHOOD X SEVERITY. Quite often this formula also includes exposure 
factor. 
Risks occur because of uncertainty about the future that may lead to the unexpected 
events typically causing some kind of damage (Waters 2011, 14). 
4.2 Risks in supply chain 
In the previous paragraph the general concept of risk management was explained in 
details. However, it is also worth taking a deeper look at how this process goes 
particularly in logistics. Supply chain risk management is the process of systematically 
identifying, analysing and dealing with risks to supply chain. In terms of risk 
management, logistics has two roles: 
1. A strategic role of designing supply chains that are resilient and can withstand 
risky events 
2. An operational role of reacting to events that actually occur and mitigating 
the effects 
To achieve this, logistics brings together a series of functions that are responsible for 
different aspects of the movement of materials. Apart from its core activities related 
to the flow of materials such as supply chain design, purchasing, inbound transport, 
receiving, warehousing, stock control, material handling, order picking, outbound 
transport, physical distribution, recycling, returns and waste disposal, there is also 
one more important function - communication which coordinates the flow of 
information. This case study mostly focuses on this particular function. Quite often 
the reason for disruptions in a supply chain is insufficient exchange of information. 
Specifically, risks to the supply chain are unforeseen events that might interrupt the 
smooth flow of materials. (Waters 2011, 43-44.) There are basically two kinds of risks 
to a supply chain: 
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1) Internal risks that appear in normal operations, such as late deliveries, excess 
stock, poor forecasts, financial risks, minor accidents, human error, faults in 
information technology systems 
2) External risks that come from outside the supply chain such as natural 
disasters, wars, crime, industrial action, price rises, shortage of raw materials, 
financial irregularities  
Even a relatively minor problem with a supply chain can have broad consequences 
– in a way that a late delivery of raw materials can affect operations resulting into 
decrease in company’s basic performance measures and impairment of its 
reputation. Therefore, the company should constantly work on eliminating or at 
least mitigating the risks. The best approach to supply chain risk management has 
each member of a chain working together in a coordinated effort to reduce the 
overall vulnerability of the whole supply chain.  However, there are many factors 
preventing integration of supply chain risk management. There are two of them 
that needs to be pointed out: the first one is limited contact between members of 
supply chains and the second one is a problem with information sharing, as a 
result, no relevant information available at all points in the supply chain – poor 
visibility. 
4.3 Risk management and assessment 
Risk management is adopted at company-level and aims at ensuring a company’s 
survival, future success and at minimizing risk-related costs. In general, there are two 
different approaches to risk management: reactive and proactive. The first one is used 
when an unforeseen event actually occurs, however, it might be too slow so that 
plenty of harm can be done before it begins to have an effect. The more effective 
approach to risk management is proactive based on analysing likely events before they 
occur and planning steps to mitigate their effect. These days managers tend to 
implement the second principle. Three core elements of risk management can be 
distinguished: 
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1. Identify risks  
Output: a list of risks facing the operational process 
2. Analyse the risks 
Output: prioritized list of risks and their expected consequences 
3. Design appropriate responses to the risk 
Output: planned response to each risk – prevention (reduce the probability), 
mitigation (reduce the consequences) or rather response (first evaluate actual 
events then act) 
The UPM Group risk management process gives broader insight. It involves regular 
monitoring and evolving approach and includes the following phases: 
1. Risk identification and assessment 
2. Development of risk management strategies 
3. Design and implementation of risk management procedures 
4. Monitoring of risk management performance 
5. Continuous improvement of risk management capabilities. (Huovinen 2009.) 
Risk assessment is an integral part of a risk management plan. It is a process of 
evaluating risks arising from hazards, taking into account any existing controls, and 
deciding whether or not risks are acceptable (reduced to a level that can be tolerated).  
It is more effective to accomplish this kind of task at the actual worksite with an input 
of operators. There are two types of risk assessment: simple (used to confirm the 
controls of an existing risk assessment) and formal (used to manage risks associated 
with projects, tasks and activities through identification of hazards and controls). 
(Rocle 2014, 4.)  
Risk assessment is a fundamental requirement for business and should consider 
everyone who could be affected by the activity. Besides employees this includes 
contractors, temporary workers, volunteers and the general public. The aim should 
always be to reduce the risks as much as is “reasonably practicable”. It means that 
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employers have to balance the cost of steps that they could take to lower a risk against 
the degree of risk presented. 
Risk assessment is an essential part of occupational safety and regulated by law. The 
Management of Health and Safety at Work (MHSW) Regulations 1999 require all 
employers and the self-employed to assess the risks from their work on anyone who 
may be affected by their activities. The Regulations require employers to execute a 
systematic examination of their work activities and record the significant findings of 
the assessment. If an employer has five or more employees, the findings must be 
recorded in writing. (Risk assessment 2017.) 
There is a number of tools and techniques used for risk assessment. One of the most 
common qualitative methods of assessing risks is probability and impact matrix. It is 
typically created for determining the probability and significance of a risk of an 
unwanted event. (Dumbravă & Vlăduț 2013, 87.) The matrix may be customized 
according to the needs of the project but it usually covers five main aspects: health 
and safety, environment, security, process safety and product safety (Rocle 2014, 1). 
Risk calculation is very simple considering that likelihood and impact of an event is 
assigned a random basis to the total that can be a particular classification (Dumbravă 
& Vlăduț 2013, 87). Those two parameters are scored numbers from one to five 
according to the degree level. (See Table 1) 
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Table 1. Simplified model of the probability and impact classification (adapted from UPM Madison, 2015) 
Score Likelihood of the event Score Severity of the impact 
1 very unlikely 5 severe 
2 unlikely 4 major 
3 possible 3 medium 
4 likely 2 minor 
5 very likely 1 not significant 
 
After awarding all the scores defined by the operators, two variables are to be 
multiplied. (Dumbravă & Vlăduț 2013, 87-88.) Based on the result, the risks are rated 
and classified from very low to very high. The classic example of the matrix is 
represented in Figure 13 where using collation of probability of the event and the 
degree of its potential consequences the assessor is able to define its risk level. For 
instance, likely event, which is expected to occur at some time with a not significant 
impact such as minor injuries or discomfort of the worker, has a medium risk level 
represented by yellow colour in the table. Green, orange and red colours refer to the 
low, high and very high risk levels respectively.  
 
Figure 13. Risk matrix template (Examspm 2016) 
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The example of using risk matrix is illustrated in Radiation Risk Assessment using 
Unsealed Radionuclides (see Table 2). If the likelihood score is thought to be three and 
the consequence score is four (from whole body dose calculations), then the risk rating 
is equal to twelve (three multiplied by four).  
Table 2. Risk matrix example (Radiation Risk Assessment 2008) 
 CONSEQUENCE LIKELIHOOD 
Rare  (1) Unlikely  (2) Possible  (3) Likely  (4) Almost certain (5) 
Catastrophic (5) 5 10 15 20 25 
Major (4) 4 8 12 16 20 
Moderate (3) 3 6 9 12 15 
Minor (2) 2 4 6 8 10 
Negligible  (1) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
The risk rating (1-25) from Table 2 corresponds to a risk score (1-4) as given: 
1. Very low 
2. Low 
3. Moderate 
4. High 
Accordingly, with the risk rating being twelve, the risk score is four referring to a high 
level of risk. That great risk is usually associated with disastrous effect. (Guidance on 
completing a Radiation Risk Assessment using Unsealed Radionuclides 2008.) 
In order to prevent fatal effect of risks, they have to be defined, assessed and managed 
beforehand. All those procedures are to be planned by company’s managers. 
5 Research and analysis 
5.1 Research plan 
The research was conducted during a period of three months from the 15th of May 
to the 15th of August 2017.  
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During this time the researcher had to study the UPM safety directives and 
instructions applied to the truck drivers (See Figure 14) 
 
Figure 14. UPM Safety directives and instructions under study 
 
The plan was to determine whether all the official rules were reflected in the actual 
instructions provided for the drivers. 
Besides content analysis, non-participant observation of how the arriving trucks 
operated was executed from the time they reached the mill site till the truck was 
unloaded. By using this method the observer could form a clear picture of how the 
drivers performed their work in the stage of the unloading process and capture the 
risky moments and violations with the help of a camera. The observations were 
conducted in May-August in the form of regular visits to the RCP warehouse once or 
twice a week between 8 am and 4 pm. The sequence of the drivers’ working process 
and bottleneck steps (where the drivers faced difficulties to perform their work and 
where safety risks arose) were represented with the help of a flowchart. The plan 
was also to report the carrier name, date of observation and tick the observed 
violations in the form of check sheets. After collecting the total number of each 
violation per each month, the observer could analyse the trend by using a run chart 
tool by connecting the changes with the performed arrangements.   
UPM General Safety Rules
Safety requirements for heavy traffic 
UPM Finland production plants
Safety driver’s orientation and online 
training (applied only to Finnish drivers)
Safety instructions for the drivers 
delivering recycled paper to UPM Kaipola
Safety guideline for Russian-speaking 
drivers
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Moreover, in order to define the risk level of the hazards that the drivers faced if 
they behaved contrary to the safety rules established in UPM and in order to 
understand which of them were the most critical ones, the author had to do risk 
assessments specifically for the drivers’ working areas including both the RCP and 
chemical pulp unloading stations. Due to the fact the author of the thesis had never 
done this before, she asked for help from the operators and managers who gave a 
template that they used for these kinds of analysis. The template consisted of several 
columns: 
• Subject/event 
• Hazard 
• Description of hazard 
• Possible consequences 
• Likelihood of occurrence 
• Current arrangements 
• Risk level 
• Future corrective arrangements 
To make the evaluation easier, the assessor divided the hazards, possible 
consequences, likelihood of occurrence and risk level into several categories.  
Figure 15 shows six types of the main hazards that the drivers can be exposed to 
while working at the mill site: moving vehicle (wheel loader or truck), traffic (any 
barrier to the necessary movement of the vehicle), falling object (unstable pile), 
protruding object (nail or beam), dust or external particles (metal or paper chips) and 
visibility impairment (steam or objects blocking the view).  
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Figure 15. Hazard classification (adapted from RCP warehouse risk assessment template) 
The exposure to those hazards can lead to four major consequences illustrated in 
Figure 16, such as serious health effects or fatalities, health injuries (bruise or sprain), 
property damage (truck construction damage) and operational disruption (delivery 
delay). 
 
Figure 16. Effects (adapted from RCP warehouse risk assessment template) 
 
Depending on the degree of possible consequences, they can be scored from one to 
five (from “not significant” to “severe”). As obviously the life and well-being of the 
employees is prior in consideration, serious impacts on their health or deaths are 
rated by the highest score. Such effects as property damage and operational 
disruptions might vary from one to four by their severity defined by the operators. 
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All the hazardous events have different likelihood of occurrence so that each of them 
can be classified accordingly to probability levels from “rare” to “almost certain” 
(scored from one to five respectively).  Based on the hazard category, its effect and 
probability of occurrence, the risk level can be defined from low to very high. Those 
were previously described in the risk matrix template. (See Figure 9, chapter 4.3) 
Semi-structured reflective interviews with the Russian-speaking drivers and 
transportation companies were supposed to be the most effective way to create a 
temporary communication bridge between UPM and the contract carriers. Due to 
the lack of common language, it is challenging to understand the reasons for 
different behaviour and cooperate in work. The answers to the open questions 
should also illustrate the general attitude of the drivers towards complying with the 
rules. The drivers were interviewed while the unloading was carried out or when 
they were waiting outside the warehouse. There were 16 questions (see Appendix 3), 
but the number varied depending on their answers. The main topics covered in the 
interview are represented in Table 3. It divides all the questions into eight categories 
and describes the reasons why particular types of question needed to be asked.  
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Table 3. Interview's topics 
QUESTION CATEGORY PURPOSE 
Carrier information To know whose employees tend to violate the rules more 
often 
Driver’s experience To understand how the frequency of the violations is 
dependent both on driver’s experience in general and at 
particular mill 
Instruction method in terms 
of OSH 
To see the difference with methods used at UPM 
Familiarization with UPM 
safety rules 
To know if the memos with UPM rules reach the drivers 
Working process To see how and in which order the driver completes each 
stage of his work 
Communication with UPM 
operators 
To defines if there is a problem of language barrier 
Difficulties in work To see the hidden reasons for violations 
Suggestions for 
improvements 
To get an idea of the arrangements that should be done to 
improve the situation 
 
The idea was to visit the warehouse for general observations and selectively ask 
some of the drivers to participate in the interview. It was very important to ascertain 
that the drivers did not know that they were supposed to be interviewed. In this 
way, it could be expected that they would reply to the questions naturally and that 
there was a bigger chance that the information was veritable. 
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5.2 Research process 
This chapter is aimed to describe the process of data collection by the researcher. 
The author of the thesis started the research with going through the safety directives 
established and documented in UPM in order to execute content analysis and 
distinguish the ones that are specifically applied to the drivers. First of all, the 
researcher tried to define to which category of the employees those drivers actually 
belong. There were two types of external workers mentioned in the rules: visitors 
and contractors. However, after looking at their definitions one made a conclusion 
that the driver does not belong to any of this group. Visitor is a person not part of 
site personnel, not working permanently on site and has a host all times such as UPM 
employee from other work places, clients, authorities, officials, university students 
and others. Contractor is a specific type of supplier that executes physical work for 
UPM on site such as cleaning personnel, catering staff, logistics operators, 
maintenance and others. Drivers are not working permanently on site but they do 
perform physical work included in their duties even though they do not directly 
participate in the unloading process. Nevertheless, they still must adhere to UPM 
General Safety Rules and partly safety rules for contractors that are summarized in 
the following list: 
§ Being in the mill area under the influence of alcohol or drugs  
§ Photography is not allowed in the UPM mill areas 
§ Smoking is not allowed at any UPM sites in Finland 
§ Eating in the mill area is only allowed in designated areas 
§ UPM will provide the suppliers with all the necessary maps when moving in 
the mill area 
§ All persons arriving in the mill area must check-in at the main gate  
This rule is not applied to the drivers since they obtain special permit to enter 
directly through the mill gates 
§ UPM’s rules regarding mobility and vehicle pass practices must be followed 
when transporting goods to or from a worksite 
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§ The vehicle pass must be placed so that all identification information is fully 
visible from outside the vehicle 
§ Sleeping in caravans or mobile homes inside the mill area or in any car parks 
is not allowed 
§ Any discrimination, harassment or bullying or any other inappropriate 
behaviour must be addressed without delay 
§ No goods may be stored in front of access routes, emergency exit routes, 
emergency showers, switch boxes, switchboards or fire extinguishing 
equipment 
§ UPM requires that the drivers work in such a manner that generates as little 
waste as possible 
§ Drivers must work in such a manner that no confidential data or materials 
end up in the possession of third parties 
§ Contractors’ employees are required to wear personal protective equipment 
(PPE) at UPM’s premises. Any employee who does not use the required PPE 
may be removed from the worksite! 
Afterwards the author of the thesis studied Safety instructions for the drivers 
delivering recycled paper to UPM Kaipola and Safety guideline for Russian-speaking 
drivers that were sent to UPM Russia in 2012 and were supposed to be distributed 
through all the partner transportation companies in order to define whether they 
were relevant. The warehouse operators were asked what were the most common 
issues in drivers’ behaviour. 
After contacting one of Finnish carriers – VR Transpoint, the researcher also received 
Safety requirements for heavy traffic UPM Finland production plants they used as the 
instructions for their drivers. The only version available is in Finnish language and all 
the drivers in this company send are Finnish-speaking.  
One of the selected research methods was interviewing the drivers with previously 
described questions aimed to reveal the actual reasons for violations. It is important 
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to note that it was difficult to organize the drivers coming at specific day and time 
since for recycled paper trucks it really depended on how smooth the process went 
at customs border, quite often the deliveries were postponed until late evening. 
Moreover, during summer time the production does not work at a full capacity 
meaning it required less raw materials so there was limited amount of trucks coming 
each week. For chemical pulp most of the drivers were coming during evenings and 
nights.  
Therefore, as a result, at RCP warehouse the researcher managed to conduct 16 
interviews including drivers from five transportation companies: NBI Transport 
Service, Logistics Service, IP Shestakov V.V., Premium Transport and IP Sergeev. (See 
Figure 17) Most of them were representing the key carrier – NBI Transport Service. 
 
Figure 17. Number of interviewed drivers per carrier 
 
Along with the interviews the author of the thesis was also observing how the 
unloading process went in general and reporting about the violations were noticed. 
For the whole period from May to July the trainee has conducted 16 observations at 
RCP warehouse and seven at chemical pulp station that proved that every single 
unloading of Russian truck is accompanying with at least one minor offense. 
5.3 Analytical process 
As a result of safety documents studies, it turned out that the instructions 
supposedly provided to Russian-speaking drivers were obsolete so that many 
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important aspects included in the UPM’s general instructions since 2012 were 
missing, therefore, they needed to be updated. Safety requirements for heavy 
traffic UPM Finland production plants used by VR Transpoint contained more 
complete set of safety rules. According to this document, all drivers must have 
and use all the necessary PPE (minimum requirement: helmet, goggles, high-
visibility vest and safety shoes) in the factory area; they must comply with the 
specified loading/unloading policy and undergo safety training (valid for two 
years) before they first arrive at the factory area inform UPM staff of any 
detected safety deficiencies (however, online training – safety induction is 
available only in Finnish, Swedish, English, German, French and Chinese, not in 
Russian); all Finnish drivers must have a valid Safety Card; and since January 1, 
2013 smoking is forbidden in the whole factory area.  
However, this guideline was available only in Finnish language, therefore, it could 
be applied only to Finnish-speaking drivers. Moreover, there were some specific 
verbal rules related to the unloading process that must have been followed by 
the driver but they were not documented anywhere, for instance: 
• It is FORBIDDEN walk/drive inside the RCP warehouse without special 
permission; 
• It is FORBIDDEN to move around the mill site in the unauthorized places; 
• While the unloading process the driver must keep away from the wheel 
loader with the considerable distance; 
• It is FORBIDDEN to stay in the truck body while the unloading process; 
• It is MANDATORY to put wheel blades under the wheels if the forklift 
drive inside the truck for unloading. 
Basically, there was no document including all the safety rules to be followed by the 
drivers and insufficient guidance about overall working procedure of the driver at 
UPM Kaipola mill. Furthermore, most of the relevant information is provided in 
Finnish or rather English language. 
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The first analysing tool, flowchart, helped to study the entire working process of the 
truck driver at UPM Kaipola and define the stages at which one faced the problems 
thereby increasing safety risks. Appendix 4 shows which steps a driver delivering RCP 
had to undergo from the moment he arrived till the moment he left. Red crosses 
show critical steps when communication and safety issues most likely to occur. For 
example, in case a driver came to UPM Kaipola for the first time, he was not 
provided with specific instructions, therefore, the driver had to leave the truck and 
go to the main entrance so that security guard could provide him with a map of the 
mill site and describe how to reach the RCP warehouse. Not having a prior guideline 
and language barrier causes misunderstanding and further violations by truck 
drivers. 
With a help of check sheets filled during observations each month, it was revealed 
that the most common violations were related to the absence of the required 
personal protective equipment (at least one item was missing) and standing close to 
or inside the truck body while the unloading process. Table 4 is the example of the 
check sheet for the first month (May 2017) of the observations. The analyst used it to 
mark with the cross noticed violations and recap the number of them hence, for 
instance, in two out of four checks the driver stayed close to the truck body while 
unloading. 
Table 4. Check sheet. May 2017 
 
Table 5 represents the statistical summary of all check sheets (observations). It 
shows what kind of and how many times violations were noticed as well as some of 
the possible risks for each of them. 
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Table 5. Violation statistic 
Violation Frequency Risk 
no goggles 11 dust particles or metal/paper chips get into eyes 
no helmet 2 falling or protruding object (pile/supporting beam) 
no HV vest 1 struck by the wheel loader 
no shoes 6 heavy/sharp obstacle, wheel loader run over feet 
inside truck body 6 struck by the wheel loader 
close to truck body 7 struck by the wheel loader 
 
The most frequently noticed violation was not wearing goggles. Eleven out of sixteen 
drivers did not follow this requirement even though it is very important to have 
goggles on. The warehouse is considered a dusty area full of metal and paper chips; 
those particles can seriously harm human eyes.  
In order to illustrate the evidence of those violations the thesis trainee was also 
taking photos and videos of on-going operations. Figure 18 shows one of such 
violations when the driver stayed dangerously close to the wheel loader while the 
truck was being unloaded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Figure 18. Example of violation 
In order to see the trend of violation frequency over time the analyst used run chart 
tool (see Figure 19). According to the chart, the blue line showing the number of 
drivers violating safety rules per month tends to descend. The number of checks per 
month remained constant – red line of the chart. Critical event happened in the 
middle of June 2017 marked on the graph with a star is the day when it was officially 
stated by the director of UPM Kaipola, Marko Laakkonen: Truck is not unloaded till 
the driver has all the required personal protective equipment (PPE) on.  
 
Figure 19. Checks vs Violations per month 
 
In the beginning of August 2017 some minor improvements such as updating of the 
mill maps and safety signs were done. These actions also supposedly influenced the 
trend. 
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As a result of risk assessment procedure conducted during the observations, the 
assessor evaluated risk levels for 15 hazardous events occurring in RCP warehouse 
and eleven – at chemical pulp station from drivers’ perspective. For better 
illustration the student represented those findings in excel table. Tables 6 and 7 give 
an example of the dangerous event, which is possible to happen in RCP warehouse 
when truck driver enters the warehouse independently without permission, wheel 
loader driver performs his work not knowing that someone else is in the warehouse. 
Such behaviour can lead to the collision of the moving wheel loader with the walking 
man that most likely would cause serious injury of the stricken man. That is why the 
risk level is considered to be high. 
Table 6. RCP Risk assessment. Part 1 
Subject/event Hazard Description of hazard 
Possible 
consequences 
Truck driver enters the 
warehouse independently 
without permission, wheel 
loader driver performs his 
work not knowing that 
someone else is in the 
warehouse 
Moving 
vehicle 
Truck driver shows up 
unexpectedly from 
around the 
corner/bale, wheel 
loader driver doesn't 
have time to react, as 
a result, collide a 
walking man 
(collision) 
Serious health 
effect or 
fatality 
 
According Table 7, there is already a sign on the wall next to the warehouse entrance 
saying in three languages that it is driving in and walking in without reflective cloth, 
however, on practice it is not sufficient to prevent this to happen. Therefore, there 
are some future arrangements to be done in order to improve the situation. 
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Table 7. RCP Risk assessment. Part 2 
Likelihood 
of 
occurrence 
Current 
arrangements 
Risk 
level 
Future corrective arrangements 
Possible 
There is a sign next 
to the warehouse 
entrance in three 
languages (Finnish, 
English and 
Russian) saying 
"No drive without 
permission! No 
walking without 
reflective 
clothing!" 
High 
Add the rule of not entering the 
warehouse without permission to 
the updated instructions; change 
the gates so that it is not possible 
to walk into the warehouse 
independently, opened only by the 
wheel loader driver, make a 
separate room for the drivers to 
wait with the call up button 
 
 
Tables 8 and 9 shows risk assessment for one probable case when the truck driver 
forgets to chock the wheels before the unloading process at chemical pulp station. 
This oversight can lead to the truck freely going backwards when the forklift gets into 
the body of a truck, as a result, uncontrolled vehicle crashes the facility objects or the 
workers on its way. This event is assigned with a very risk level. 
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Table 8. CP Risk assessment. Part 1 
Subject/event Hazard Description of hazard Possible consequences 
Truck driver 
forgets to put 
the wheel 
blades under 
the wheels 
 Moving 
vehicle 
The truck is not fixed 
before unloading, as a 
result, freely goes 
backwards when the 
forklift gets into the 
body of a truck or even 
after a slight push and 
crashes everything on its 
way 
Property damage/ 
health injury 
 
The proposed solution represented in the section “future corrective arrangements” 
of Table 9 for this problem is to make the place of wheel blades storage more visible 
and put the sign warning to chock the wheels. This also should be included in safety 
instructions and controlled by the operators. 
Table 9. CP Risk assessment. Part 2 
Likelihood of 
occurrence 
Current 
arrangements 
Risk level 
Future corrective 
arrangements 
Likely 
Wheel blades are 
stored next to the 
platform 
Very high 
Make the place of wheel 
blades storage more visible 
and put the sign reminding 
to put them under the 
wheels; add the rule to the 
undated instructions; do 
not start unloading until 
they are at the place 
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Risk assessment in RCP and CP warehouses revealed occupational hazards and their 
criticality as well as highlighted the need for corrective arrangements in order to 
eliminate the risks associated with them.  
Along with the observations, the researcher conducted the interviews. All the 
interviews were recorded by the author of the thesis with drivers’ permission. As a 
result, the correspondent discovered that familiarising with the safety rules primarily 
depended on how experienced was the driver and how often one had already visited 
Kaipola paper mill before. In general, NBI drivers violated the rules less frequently 
since most of them had been transporting transport recovered paper to the UPM 
Kaipola plant for one to ten years on average once or two times a month. Through 
the interviews the author also knew that the drivers were instructed regarding 
personal protective equipment and some specific requirements before each 
shipping. All of the drivers said that they were instructed with general safety rules at 
least monthly but only a few of them saw the guidance specifically applied to the 
UPM Kaipola factory. However, some of them recalled that they were given some 
basic instructions a long time ago. First comers were usually on the phone with the 
experienced drivers or contact UPM Office in Russia. This is how the drivers 
explained their violations: 
• It is inconvenient to work wearing helmet (falls down) or goggles (fall down or 
become steamed) 
• Being in a hurry forgot to put some piece of the equipment 
• No person to control 
• Employer did not provide with all required PPE 
• Trying to save time by moping the truck body and bringing the safety beams 
back step by step while unloading 
• Staying close to the truck body while unloading due to a need of holding a 
truck tarpaulin (opening part) in order to help the wheel loader 
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• The construction of the truck does not allow to fold the belts outside the 
truck, the wheel loader gets muddled in the free hanging belts and often 
tears them up going backwards after picking up the bale 
Figure 20 represents all those reasons with numerical data. Inconvenience of PPE 
and timesaving were the most common ones. Many of the drivers pointed out that 
helmet often fell down when they had to stoop while performing physical work, 
goggles had some scratches and became misted which impaired the visibility.   
 
Figure 20. Most common reasons for violations (Interviews summary) 
 
During the interviews the drivers were also inquired about the difficulties they ever 
faced while working at Kaipola mill – most of them said that they were not able to 
perform the weighting operation on their own at the terminal since the menu was 
available only in Finnish, Swedish or rather English (not Russian) and the provided 
instructions were not sufficient: some steps were missing or different from the actual 
ones, moreover, even in English version of the menu some steps were still in Finnish. 
Surprisingly, no one regarded language barrier in communication with the operators 
as an issue. 
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At the end of the interview the drivers were asked to give some suggestions for 
improvement: 
• In order to prevent drivers from going inside the warehouse, change the 
gates and make a special room with ring bottom to call the wheel loader 
driver up in case he is not at the place for a long time; 
• To reduce the number of steps in weighting procedure, make a Russian menu 
at the terminal or just replace the existing system with fully automated 
scales; 
• Appoint an inspector checking the availability of all PPE and ensuring the 
compliance with the safety rules; 
• In case rules are not followed, fine the transportation company or do not 
unload the truck; 
• Ask the wheel loader driver to point out if any of PPE is missing to remind to 
put it on. 
In addition to interviewing the drivers, the researcher contacted the UPM Russia 
office and several key carriers including forwarding company that represents one 
more communication hub and helps in searching for extra drivers. The thesis trainee 
managed to talk to Alexander Fedotov – Sourcing Manager at UPM Russia, Rimma 
Fedulova – representative of Truckline forward agency, Dmitriy Khummer – a 
director of NBI Transport Service and the owner of I.P. Shestakov carrier. According 
to Alexander Fedotov the safety instructions UPM Kaipola were received around five 
years ago (in 2012), two years after he obtained a memo with all the required PPE 
and approximately one to two years ago the weight bridge instructions. Alexander 
distributed all this information to the key carriers and forwarding company Truckline. 
Since then he did not receive any updates and was not informed about any issues 
with the drivers neither from the side of UPM Kaipola nor from the carriers. The 
director of NBI Transport Service said that UPM safety instructions were sent to him 
five years ago and weight bridge instructions three years later, drivers were 
instructed in terms of occupational safety once a month and warned about 
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mandatory usage of PPE before each shipping. Moreover, he did not receive any 
information about his drivers’ violations from UPM. However, the drivers reported to 
him that they still had difficulties in using weight bridge system at Kaipola mill as 
provided instructions were not clear and automatic disruptions happened as well. 
Moreover, there was no guideline for the drivers coming to the mill for the first time. 
Rimma Fidulova was sending all the instructions received from Alexander Fedotov to 
the carriers and the drivers were instructed at their working places by the managers. 
She had never been informed about the violations. Vladislav Shestakov said that was 
regularly receiving safety instructions from Rimma Fedulova and instructing his 
drivers before each shipping. As he sometimes transported RCP to UPM Kaipola 
himself, he knew all the difficulties the drivers faced. Accordingly, it was very difficult 
to weight the truck at the terminal without operator’s help, some PPE was 
inconvenient that is why the drivers avoided wearing it and one of the most 
significant issues was the poor quality of the supplied material which tangled the 
working process. 
Data analysis of the safety documents, observations and interviews helped to 
identify different types of factors causing safety violations. Those are illustrated in 
Ishikawa diagram represented in Figure 21. There are six categories of causes. 
Material describes factors related to raw materials and information issues, for 
example, poor quality of paper piles. Method is associated with the operational 
processes such as no security control of coming trucks. Machine is mostly related to 
equipment failures as for instance disruptions in work of weight bridge system. Man 
means physical or knowledge work, cultural particularities and coordination 
problems. The examples of this type of factors are lack of communication with 
carriers as well as language barrier between foreign truck drivers and UPM 
operators. Measurement refers to poor assessment and monitoring of the operations 
– insufficient reporting system and environment represents external factors causing 
disorders – too much raw material in RCP warehouse. 
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Figure 21. Causes of safety violation. Ishikawa diagram 
 
Key issues leading to the safety violations represented in fishbone diagram were, first 
of all, the lack of communication with the raw material suppliers and carriers 
arranging the delivery to the paper factory as well as absence of complete adapted 
guidance in terms of safety and working process for the foreign drivers. Language 
barrier and different cultural perception of occupational safety required more 
rigorous approach to safety instructions and security control. 
5.4 Cultural aspect 
One of the root causes of occurred safety issues the author of the thesis discovered 
during the analysis was different attitude towards complying with the rules by 
foreign drivers, in particular, the ones who come from Russia. After studying the 
theory and survey conclusions of Hofstede described in chapter 3.2, the author of 
the thesis decided to use it for the research as well for comparison of Finland and 
Russia. Figure 22 generated from the website Hofstede Insights provides the relation 
between rates of all indexes defined by sociologist for Finland (blue columns) and 
Russia (violate columns). Three out of six indexes were picked up: power distance, 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance. To the researcher’s point of view, those are 
the most relevant for comparison the difference in attitudes towards complying with 
the rules in two countries. 
Power distance index (the greater the number, the more people accept that power 
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is distributed unevenly in the country). According to Figure 19, Finland scores 33 
whereas Russia – 93. In general, Nordic countries are known for their high level of 
equality, therefore, Finland is featured by large middle class, legitimacy of power, 
equal rights and obligations no matter status. Whereas in Russia historically 
inequality is expected and desired: less powerful people should be dependent on the 
more powerful; people taking higher position in the organization have more 
privilege, respect and authority. In the thesis case it can be interpreted in a way that 
in Finnish working environment all the rules are represented the same to all the 
employees so that everyone is obliged and self-responsible to follow them while 
Russian low class workers such as, for example, drivers need to be controlled by the 
authority who has a power and leverage, otherwise, the regulations are not taken 
serious. 
Collectivism vs Individualism index (the greater the number, the more uniqueness 
and independence is appreciated in the society). Index of Russia is 39, Finnish score 
is 63. Influenced by the Soviet Union past, Russians are considered as collectivists 
which means that laws and rights differ by group, opinions and behaviour of other 
members of group are reflected, occurred problems tend to be managed in groups 
whereas Finns are more individual as laws and rights are supposed to be the same 
for all and the decisions are, in general, made individually and responsibly. In my 
thesis case it was observed that Russian drivers tended to come to the mill team wise 
(usually two drivers at a time), in the interviews they often referred to other workers 
who did not follow the rules showing that this model of behaviour is normal – 
illustrative example is very important to them. Finnish drivers work independently 
and take the responsibility of meeting the requirements individually derived by law 
and natural necessity of self-protection. 
Uncertainty avoidance (the greater the number, the more people feel threatened by 
uncertain/unknown situation). Russia rates up to 95 while Finland – only 59. Finnish 
people do not like uncertainty that is why they prefer to set up the precise rules and 
follow them – everything should be 
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uncertainty avoidance, for that reason very many different laws and regulations are 
established which makes it more difficult to comply with as they vary greatly per 
organization. During the research the author of the thesis realized that safety rules in 
different organizations were basically the same and were accepted quite a long time 
ago that is why for local drivers, for example, wearing a specific set of PPE already 
became a work-related habit while Russian drivers were confused with some 
requirements such as wearing goggles if they were never obliged before in other 
organizations and personally did not see a necessity of doing that. 
 
Figure 22. Cultural dimensions. Index comparison Russia vs Finland (adapted from Hofstede Insights, 
2017) 
 
Before jumping into results it is useful to make a summary of the analysis 
represented in Table 10. It provides the information about core findings revealed 
with the help of different RCA tools.  
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Table 10. RCA Summary 
RCA method  Key findings 
Flowchart Violations at the stages: 
- arrival (first time) 
- weight bridge 
- upon reaching warehouse (in case operator is 
absent) 
- while unloading  
Check sheet ≈ 74 % of drivers did not meet safety requirements 
Most frequent violations: 
- not wearing goggles in ≈ 69 % of cases 
staying dangerously close to the truck body while unloading process 
in ≈ 44 % of cases 
Run chart No of violations dropped from 4 to 2 per month after the official 
statement by the director of UPM Kaipola, Marko Laakkonen: Truck is 
not unloaded till the driver has all the required personal protective 
equipment (PPE) on  
Cause-effect 
diagram 
Core RC groups accounted for violations: 
MAN 
- lack of communication with carriers and suppliers 
- language barrier 
- different attitude toward complying with safety 
rules (supported by Hofstede cultural dimensions 
comparison) 
MATERIAL 
- outdated or lacking safety information and signs 
- incomplete safety instructions for foreign drivers 
MEASUREMENT 
- incomplete risk assessment of the working areas 
- no regular safety inspections 
insufficient reporting system 
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5.5 Results 
As a result of analytical process, the author of the thesis was able to reveal several 
main root causes for safety problems regarding foreign drivers: 
• Different attitude towards complying with the rules 
69 % of interviewed drivers did not understand the necessity of wearing 
goggles and avoided following the safety requirement unless any notice from 
the side of UPM employee had been given. 17 out of 23 drivers (≈ 74 %) did 
not meet at least one of safety requirements. The origin of different attitude 
towards complying with safety rules was explained in chapter 5.4 – Russians 
are used to take behaviour model from their co-workers and need to be 
examined by authorities to follow established rules. It means that there is a 
necessity to arrange some person in control or penalty for safety violations. 
Placing controls over hazards is an essential part of safety management 
system; 
• Lack of communication between supply chain hubs  
According to cause-effect diagram represented in chapter 5.3., one of the 
man related causes is a lack of communication between UPM Kaipola and its 
suppliers and carriers. The survey of UPM Russia and major carriers’ 
representatives showed that they were not informed about safety violations 
by the drivers. There is also no visibility when and in which form the 
information reaches the end user (in this particular case: the driver) which 
needs to be improved by UPM making more frequent contacts to their 
Russian side or providing the drivers with the clear guidelines directly at the 
place; 
• Obsolete set of safety rules available  
The last updated instructions were provided to the carriers by UPM Kaipola in 
2012. Therefore, drivers were not familiar with some new requirements 
established in UPM Kaipola since then. It means that the safety guidelines 
must be constantly updated and given to all the suppliers and contract 
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carriers in relevant language. There are also a few unwritten rules that should 
be included into general safety instructions related to the driver’s position 
during unloading process; 
• Lack of signs and supporting guidance at the mill site 
Most of the information is provided only in Finnish language (partly in 
English) such as mill site maps, warning signs and weight bridge system. 
According to conducted interviews, difficulties in using weight bridge system 
was the biggest concern of the drivers. Moreover, variation in behaviours of 
first-time coming and experienced drivers is considerable. The less 
experience, the more violations meaning more safety risks. It means there 
should be a special detailed guideline for those drivers. Moreover, some of 
the signs are quite old and not relevant anymore, therefore, everything must 
be updated and general information to be translated at least into English and 
Russian languages. 
 
Interviews of foreign drivers, contacts with carriers’ representatives, signs 
and instructions updates as well as involvement of warehouse operators into 
safety control process already brought some positive results and arose 
awareness about OHS importance of contract carriers. Based on summary of 
check sheets, the number of RCP drivers who did not follow the rules 
dropped from four to two per month. However, it is important to note that 
due to low demand of raw materials (planned summer shutdowns) and 
unscheduled arrivals of the drivers only 23 of them were observed for the 
whole period of traineeship (from May to August 2017). Therefore, the 
results are quite subjective and possibly would vary in case of longer period 
of research and greater amount of incoming trucks. Extra hazards emerged 
due to harsh weather conditions (especially during winter time) and different 
number of inexperienced drivers would influence the results as well. 
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Critical analysis of the research results can be found in Table 11. Four main 
criteria: validity, reliability, credibility and transferability are rated by average 
of their main components using a scale from 1 to 5. However, first of all, the 
meaning of these notions should be clarified. Validity refers to the degree to 
which a research accurately reflects or assess intended object of study – 
capability of answering the research questions. Reliability is concerned with 
accuracy of the actual measuring instruments – the research can be repeated 
with consistent results.  
Credibility defines if the research results are trustworthy and supported by 
the researcher’s findings. (Marsden 2013.) Transferability means that the 
research results may be useful for other researchers who are either involved 
or interested in research of the same kind (Green 2005, 62) 
 
Table 11. Critical analysis of the research results 
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Although based on Table 11 the research work can be considered as credible 
and transferable, validity and reliability of the results are still under question 
due to the fact that a sample size of observed and interviewed drivers is not 
vast to make unambiguous conclusions and can provide a limited view to 
safety violation reasons. Moreover, as the occurrence of violations decreased 
already during the research work (represented by the run chart in chapter 
5.3), in case the research was conducted again, the results would not be 
consistent. However, it can be explained by the fact that the improvement 
started to be done along with the research process that obviously effected 
the situation.  
Unfortunately, the researcher did not have and opportunity to repeat the 
experiment over and over but she had a chance to observe the same driver 
coming to the RCP warehouse in the end of May (29.05.17) and June 
(27.06.17), the second time he was also interviewed. Finally, these two 
observations were counted as one as the same violations were noticed – no 
helmet and goggle while the unloading process (see Figure 23). That proves 
that under the same conditions the driver tends to violate the rules in the 
same way. In this case the variation between observation 1 and observation 2 
is zero meaning high reliability of the result. 
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Figure 23.  Observations of the same driver 
 
The process of root cause elimination is described in chapter 6 with a list of 
improvement proposals – actions the author of the thesis considered 
necessary to be implemented both in the nearest time (the ones which do 
not require many resources and can be applied within practical training 
period) and in the long run (the ones which are typically associated with 
considerable investments and can be undertaken in perspective of one to 
three years). 
6 Improvement proposals 
In order to solve root causes, the author of the thesis made a range of 
improvement proposals applied to general, RCP and CP operations. They 
were mainly divided into two groups: the ones that can be implemented 
within a short period of time (one to two months) without any special 
resources and the others that would require significant financial investments 
and can be considered in the long run. 
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6.1 General arrangements 
• Actions in the first instant are: 
o To make a specific set of requirements for local and international 
drivers transporting raw materials to UPM Kaipola; 
o To update the mill site map and add information in English and 
Russian languages. Provide contract carriers with a new version and 
place A3 laminated map at key points such as weight bridge, chemical 
pulp unloading station and others; 
o To establish an official statement: Truck is not unloaded till the driver 
has all the required personal protective equipment (PPE) on! and 
make the operators who directly work with the foreign drivers 
demonstrate relevance of this rule – do not start unloading until it is 
followed; 
o To reduce the number of contract carriers and stick with the most 
reliable ones in order to avoid the probability of a new driver not 
familiar with safety rules coming to the mill and make communication 
process between supply chain hubs easier. 
• Actions in the long run are: 
o To replace the existing gates by automatic system equipped with 
licence plate reader so that only preregistered trucks are allowed to 
enter the mill area; 
o To add more languages to the menu of the existing weight bridge 
system (at least Russian and Polish) or replace it by semi/fully-
automatic system equipped with licence plate reader and barcode 
scanner so that all the information about the truck and transported 
cargo is directly transferred to the company database. 
6.2 RCP operations 
• Actions in the first instant: 
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o To make a specific set of safety, behaviour and operational 
requirements for the drivers supplying recycled paper to UPM Kaipola 
at least in three languages: Finnish, English and Russian 
o To create a step-by-step guideline for the drivers coming to the plant 
for the first time including the updated mill site map with the 
specified route to RCP warehouse. Forward it together with the 
developed rules in respect of safety, behaviour and operations to the 
contract carriers in Russia 
o To make a detailed instruction for the truck weighting with 
illustrations and explanations in Russian language. Send them to the 
transportation companies and place the laminated version at the 
weighbridge next to the terminal (see Figure 24) 
 
 
Figure 24. Weight bridge instructions 
 
o To update the existing signs and memos at the weighbridge, transform 
general information into trilingual format; 
o To place a sign: Truck is not unloaded till the driver has all the 
required personal protective equipment (PPE) on! next to the 
entrance of the RCP warehouse; 
o To mark the unloading area and arrange a safe place for the drivers to 
stay while the unloading process as well as parking lots for the wheel 
loaders and tractors; 
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o To extend the fences of paper bales storage places to reduce the risk 
of them falling down on a person. 
• Actions in the long run are: 
o To use services of the carriers which have trucks with moving floor, tilt 
body or rotary dump as current unloading of baled recycled paper is 
quite time-consuming and risky so better find the way to supply loose 
paper instead of piles from Russia; 
o To install the electric gates so that the truck drivers are not able to 
enter the RCP warehouse independently; 
o To install the call up bottom next to the gates for letting the 
warehouse worker know that a new truck driver arrived. 
 
6.3 Chemical pulp operations 
• Actions in the first instant are: 
o To make a specific set of safety, behaviour and operational 
requirements for the drivers supplying chemical pulp to UPM Kaipola 
at least in three languages: Finnish, English and Russian. Send these 
instructions along with the updated mill site map showing the route to 
chemical warehouse to the contract carriers; 
o To put a trilingual (Finnish, English and Russian) sign on the wall next 
to the unloading deck stating: Chock the wheels before unloading! 
and mark somehow the area where the wheel chocks are located 
o To place a sign: Entry the warehouse without permission is 
forbidden! Truck is not unloaded till the driver has all the required 
personal protective equipment (PPE) on! 
o All the drivers should be aware of that unloading is not allowed 
during the time 6-10 am and 3-7 pm due to VR carriage transfers, 
therefore, place the sign stating that on the wall next to the unloading 
deck, mark/fence the area with traffic cones/warning ribbon for the 
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time of this operation and arrange a parking place for the drivers to 
wait in case they came at these hours 
o In addition to the mill site map create a scheme dividing the unloading 
area into three zones: dangerous, risky and safe and, therefore, 
showing the driver where to stay while the unloading process (see 
Figure 25). Both maps should be placed on the wall next to the 
unloading deck; 
 
 
Figure 25. Chemical pulp station map 
 
o To remove the old unused “Shell” gas station from the safe area; 
o To attach rubber bumpers to the contact side of the unloading deck to 
prevent platform damage caused by inaccurate truck parking (see 
Figure 26). 
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Figure 26. Rubber bumpers in the unloading area 
 
 
• Actions in the long run are: 
o To install a call up bottom next to the loading deck for letting the 
warehouse worker know that a new truck driver arrived 
Some of the arrangements such as updating safety instructions were already applied 
during the traineeship period, however, unfortunately, the author of the thesis did 
not have an opportunity to see how the rest of them were implemented and if it 
ultimately improved the situation at UPM Kaipola. Therefore, considering the 
development of the thesis work, it would be valuable to repeat the research within a 
shorter period of time, but under the same conditions and using the same research 
methods.  
7 Conclusion 
The research work evidenced that occupational safety is crucial not only from 
perspective of employees’ well-being but also in terms of logistics operational 
efficiency. Even minor work incident can bring numerous disruptions in the supply 
chain such as delays, excess stock, shortages of raw materials and others as well as 
many indirect costs that are often not taken into consideration. That is why these 
days there is a number of organizations in Europe as, for example, EU-OSHA, working 
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on developing of fundamental safety principles and standards that should be applied 
in each company. However, growing network of international channels creates 
challenges to ensure the compliance with safety management systems throughout 
different logistics hubs of a company, especially outside European Union where 
safety regulations and controls as well as safety culture perception may vary.  
 
UPM Kaipola study case is a great demonstrative example of how a sustainable 
company aiming to become the industry leader in safety still faces difficulties dealing 
with foreign contract workers. During the research it was revealed that the UPM 
safety management system needs to be improved and adapted to specific groups of 
employees (Russian-speaking contract carriers). Based on content analysis of related 
safety documents, observation and interviews of the drivers, the researcher made a 
conclusion that it is necessary to update and enlarge safety guidance, involve 
operators into safety control process and maintain information exchange both with 
suppliers and carriers. That way the company is able to raise awareness of its 
partners about safety importance and gain better control over their operations, 
thereby, considerably reduce risks of incident at work and enhance its logistics 
operational efficiency. Due to relevant credibility and transferability of the thesis 
work, applied research methodology can be also used to study analogic problem in 
other companies. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Key Performance Indicators. UPM Kaipola. May 2017 
(adapted with permission) 
Indicators Category for UPM Kaipola 2017 
Safety 
LTAF (lost-time accident frequency) improved 
TRIF (total recordable injury frequency) improved 
Safety observation factor  weak 
Sick leaves weak 
Safety culture level improved 
Customer satisfaction 
Customer claims  €/t KAI4-weak, KAI6 & KAI7-target 
Customer claims pcs1000 t KAI4-weak, KAI6 & KAI7-target 
Cost effectivenes 
NHS % KAI4 & KAI7-improved, KAI6-weak 
Power factor KAI4-improved, KAI6-weak, KAI7-target 
Variable costs index KAI4 & KAI7-target, KAI6-weak 
Total costs index improved 
Overheads index target 
Power factor (general) improved 
Electricity consumption, MWH/t target 
Personal strength target 
Productivity target 
Environmental friendliness 
Water use m3/t improved 
Chemical oxygen demand (COD t/d) target 
Nitrogen kg/d target 
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Appendix 2. Flow of information from UPM Kaipola to a driver. Five 
communication levels 
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Appendix 3. Interview questions 
 
1. Hello! My name is Maria. I’m a student of JAMK. At the moment I have my 
internship in this organization and as part of it conduct a research to reveal 
the reason of safety violations by contract workers. Could you please take 
part in my interview that will take no more than 10 minutes? 
2. So at first introduce yourself. What is your name and in which 
transportation company do you work? 
3. How often do you supply raw materials to this organization? 
4. Have you been instructed in terms of occupational safety? Where and 
how? 
5. Did you have to verify that you are familiar with the general safety rules, 
for example, by being tested? Did you have to put your signature as a 
confirmation of having been instructed? Do you have a safety card? 
6. Are you familiar with the safety rules of this particular organization? Have 
you seen these safety instructions for the drivers? (Show the memo) 
7. Who provides you with the required safety equipment (helmet, high 
visibility vest, safety glasses and shoes)? 
8. How often can you have breaks for smoking/having snack/etc.? Do you 
know that it is prohibited to smoke within the whole area of this 
organization? 
9. Tell me step-by-step how the process goes from the moment you enter the 
main gates? 
10. Do you have any difficulties at the weighbridge point? Do you weighting by 
yourself? 
11. In case you have to wait outside till another truck gets unloaded, what do 
you usually do? How much time does it take? 
12. What do you do in case the operator is absent? 
13. What do you do while your truck is being unloaded? How much time on 
average does it usually take? 
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14. How do you communicate with the operator? 
15. What difficulties have you ever experienced when working at this mill? 
16. Do you think that the safety instructions you had and all the provided 
memos/signs are sufficient and clear to follow? What should be 
changed/improved? 
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Appendix 4. Flowchart: Representation of a driver’s working process at 
UPM Kaipola 
 
